This blog contains original articles as well as articles from the book "Start-Up", by Hervé Lebret, which exists both in English and French. It is available on Amazon as well as in electronic versions. To buy it, click here.

Posts Tagged ‘Business Angels’

Super angels: recycling of old stuff?

Wednesday, June 22nd, 2011 Comment »

In my current reading of old Red Herring and Upside magazines (see for example Google in 2000 and Funny Data in the Internet Bubble), I just discovered an interesting ar4ticle about how angels may replace venture capitalists (Upside 1999).

They take a one example sendmail which did not go with Kleiner Perkins, Accel or IVP but closed a $6M round with business angels at a $20M valuation. The article also mentions the Band of Angels, agroup of then 120 investors having invested a total of $44M with an average investment of $600k and the Angel’s Forum with 20 investors putting up to $500k per start-up.

Sendmail raised $35M in 2000 (series D), $14M in 2002, as well as debt financing (at least $7M) as recently as 2009. Sendmail is still private so difficult to say if it is/will be a success or not.

I had doubts in a recent post on Super Angels being new stuff, this shows it is clearly not that new…

Super Angels

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010 1 Comment »

I just come back from vacation and all of a sudden I discover that the world has changed! Before my break you had the business angels investing in the early rounds (up to $1M) and the VCs who would seldom invest in rounds smaller than $1-2M. Now the frontier is blurred: you have the seed VCs (Index seed being a recent one) and the Super Angels fighting for the same deals.

If you want to know more, you will find plenty of posts and news such as:

VCs And Super Angels: The War For The Entrepreneur from Techcrunch.

Why Micro-VCs Are So Damn Friendly from Xconomy.

‘Super Angels’ Alight from the WSJ.

Micro VCs Are all BFFs… Forever? by David Beisel.

All this is not so new as Business Week mentioned the phenomenon in May 2009: ‘Super Angels’ Shake Up Venture Capital.

And I should not forget Fred Destin’s blog where i first read about all this: Super Angels, Lean VCs, Proto-Incubators, whatever. Focus on social contract. He also published an article about European SuperAngels.

So what is new here? Well I am not sure, I may just be so much remote that I have missed a big trend. Or is it just that the VC and high-tech world is such in a crisis that it is looking for new models. They were always big angels. Arthur Rock for Intel and Apple, Andy Bechtolsheim for Google or Magma, and Sequoia did the seed round for Yahoo, so what?

Well the VCs have really big funds up to a billion so investing in small rounds is tough but they have understood and move back to seed. Entrepreneurs think angels are nicer, but check again my posts on the Tesla story and Elon Musk.

Finally there is a strong argument that Internet and software companies may not need as much capital as start-ups in the past and another argument that entrepreneurs just look to sell their company to Google for $25M which is not so bad, so they might not need VCs anymore. But then, Silicon Valley faces the risk of not creating new Apples or Googles… So it is probably just “back to the future”…

Business angels and venture capitalists

Tuesday, November 24th, 2009 Comment »

The question often arises about the difference between the two groups, business angels and venture capitalists. The simple answer, which claims that angels come at the seed and early stages whereas VCs only come later, is misleading. For example, Google got $1M from Business Angels initially whereas Yahoo got its 1st million from Sequoia. In fact the differences are elsewhere. A recent academic article theorizes some of these differences and I describe them below.

I have a tendency to say that venture capital was the institutionalization of angels. In the 60s, there was not much venture capital and the first funds were built by the syndication of angel and institutional money. Even today, some groups of angels syndicate their money and look like venture capital. So they are indeed quite similar.

The recent academic paper I just mentioned is “Prediction and control under uncertainty: outcomes in angel investing” written by Wiltbalm, Read, Dew and Sarasvathy and published in the Journal of Business Venturing. Because of copyright issues, I am not sure you can access the paper but you can try and click the picture below.

The authors define angel investor as “a wealthy individual who acts as an informal venture capitalist”. Informal venture capitalist and institutional business angel look very similar so we do not disagree. One manages his money directly; the other manages others’ money. But there is much more than this. Forget about conditions in term sheets. They have become very similar even if some claims business angels are easier to work with. You will find good and bad people in both groups. The paper I mention above is very interesting at another level. It categorizes investors in two groups. I am certainly simplifying as these academic papers are often too detailed for a blog!

On one side, the authors claim you have investors who focus on prediction, on the other side, those who emphasize control. Prediction means here that you see a long-term business opportunity and you deploy the resources adequate for this ambition. Control means you do not know about long term so you plan short term and you act as you learn. No real need for a business plan. Let me describe this further using the terms of the authors.

“Predictive strategies include market research using formal tools such as surveys, detailed financial models leading to careful calculations of risk-adjusted expected return, etc., and are very familiar to virtually anyone involved in writing business plans… However, high uncertainty may reduce the accuracy and usefulness of prediction… One concept suggests that to the extent you can control the future you do not need to predict. Such actors begin with who they are, what they know and whom they know, rather than with a predetermined vision or externally validated “opportunity.” This means that they do not evaluate opportunities based on expected return. Instead they work with any and all interested. In other words, those who commit something valuable to come on board help determine what the venture will do next. People are working on things within their control, working to expand the zone of things they can materially control, obviating the need to predict the future.”

What are the implications of the two strategies?

The authors claim the following: “Findings show that emphasizing control strategies is significantly related to experiencing fewer negative exits and those investors who emphasize prediction make significantly larger investments, but do not experience more homeruns. We found that angel investors who performed more due diligence experienced significantly more homeruns, and significantly more negative exits (thus fewer moderate exits). Also, angel investors who participated more with their ventures, post-investment, experienced fewer negative exits. Surprisingly, we found that investors who concentrated on very early stage opportunities experienced fewer negative exits. These results raise important considerations about the use of prediction and control as decision tools in highly uncertain settings. Understanding the differential use of these strategic approaches may be relevant not only to angel investors but also to venture capitalists, corporate entrepreneurs, and managers making decisions in very uncertain situations.”

These are quite interesting and also surprising. If I fully understand the advantages of the control strategy, it seems strange that a homerun may come with a conservative strategy. But control does not mean conservative, it means more pragmatic. This is my understanding of the thing.

For those who read my book, you may remember the analysis of venture capital that I had taken from Tim Cruttenden. I see some similarities between his description and the two categories of the paper with the major exception that Cruttenden expects more homeruns (and more failures) with aggressive strategies. What do you think?