Category Archives: Silicon Valley and Europe

Tech – When Silicon Valley Changes the World (final part)

I advertise this book to my friends and colleagues. This is definitely the book I wish I had written. Everything is said, as we sometimes say! You will find previous articles here and there.

The workers of Silicon Valley

Chapter 6 is dedicated to developers, coders. Historian Alfred Chandler has shed light on how the centralization of information and decision-making by top and head managers, located at the top of separate divisions, constituted a comparative advantage for the leading companies that emerged in the 19th century in the fields of transport, energy and communications. Managers prevail as intermediaries between producers-suppliers and customers-demanders. They embody and concentrate power for functional reasons, because they allow the coherent, hierarchical and vertical circulation of information and decision-making within companies.
Through the writings and conclusions of F. Brooks ([in The Mythical Man-Month] shows an inverse pattern. According to him, to give free rein to the iteration process necessary for software production, the work must be coordinated horizontally, to favor support for the continuity of software development. He pleads in favor of small teams gathered around a central worker, whom he compares to a “chief surgeon” placed, no longer upstream and overhanging as in the large companies analyzed by A. Chandler, but at the heart of the action.
This mode of organization aims to adapt to the type of product that is the software and its characteristics in terms of production. Developers project themselves into a job without knowing the outcome, the time required, or the final properties of the production process. Software design thus necessarily proceeds via projections. If the developers can rely on scenarios, visions, schemes, diagrams, these do not allow a lasting and stable coordination unlike scripts in the cinema or scores in the field of music. This dimension explains the role assigned to managers in Silicon Valley companies. It is not a question of circulating information between managers at the top of different divisions to control the work of subordinates but of ensuring the coherence and coordination of the team within the framework of a project. […] If the developers cannot rely on downstream continuity supports, they mobilize a series of tools upstream of the production process [Pages 316-18].

Start a business

Founding a business is a more radical choice. […] This entrepreneurial move to action turns out to be paradoxical if we consider the treatment that developers are given within Silicon Valley companies and the low chances of leading a company to success, i.e., according to the criteria of investors, a sale or an IPO. For those who work for the big names in tech, leaving to start your own company means giving up, for an unknown period of tim,e a high salary, bonuses, health insurance, free catering and transport services, maternity and paternity leave, child care systems, etc., all for a greater amount of work. From this point of view, the creation of a business does not meet the criteria of rational choice within a professional group that is nevertheless attached to objectivity, reason and logic.
While many cite Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial culture to justify this shift, they also point to the desire to retain control of the value possibly generated by their work. Indeed, the creation of a business proves for the developers not the surest means of enrichment but the one which represents the greatest potential [Page 335].

Burning man, an inverted carnival

When I started reading the last part of his book, I wondered why Olivier Alexandre devoted so many pages to this very special event that is the Burning Man festival. The chapter devoted to it therefore deserves careful reading, starting with a note on page 529: “The habitus is a set of enduring dispositions which consists of categories of appreciation and judgment and engenders social practices adjusted to social positions. Acquired during the early education and the first social experiences, it also reflects the trajectory and later experiences: the habitus results from a progressive integration of social habits. This explains why, placed in similar conditions, the agents have the same vision of the world, the same idea of what can be done and what cannnot be done, the same criteria for choosing their hobbies and their friends, the same clothing or aesthetic tastes” [Anne-Catherine Wagner in Les 100 mots de la sociologie].

It is from this remarkable point of view that the term “connection” finds multiple uses in Burning Man: connecting with others, reconnecting with oneself, connecting with the festival, connecting the different stages of one’s life (or according to Steve Jobs’ formula “connect the dots”) or take MDMA or LSD to better “feel the connection” (with other people, the environment, etc.), etc. This mode of engagement, which is based on immediacy and interaction, ultimately leads to bringing into play habits, stabilized and incorporated representations, including in terms of self-representation. This bringing into play of habitus proceeds from a series of tests [Pages 361-62].

As seen above, Silicon Valley is characterized by a significant turnover of workers. Their high geographic mobility poses uncertainty about the sustainability of relations. The idea that a departure almost overnight is within the realm of possibility remains deeply rooted in people’s minds. Especially since Silicon Valley has had one of the highest divorce rates in the country since the 1980s and expatriates rarely see their families. For these various reasons, the Burning Man represents for certain participants a “family” of substitution. In 2008, 67% of participants were in contact with Burners outside the festival [Page 380].

For the participants, the festival tends in different ways to enchant a world that they contribute the rest of the year to disenchant through the production of digital tools, measuring instruments, calculation methods and a rationalist approach. Art is not considered an object but a support for interaction. As a component of an environment, it allows the development of skills before, during and after the festival. The latter confronts the Burners with a series of tests whose learning and experiences are reinvested during the rest of the year, within the framework of projects. In this, the Burning Man is not a simple party, a festival or a laboratory, but a device that makes possible the interconnection between individuals, repertoires of skills and communities of practice. It leads to the construction of an ethos oriented towards change. [Page 382]

Silicon Valley, a political project?

Olivier Alexandre ends his book with what the region represents from a political point of view. A place of experimentation par excellence, this region is also at the origin or development of movements such as libertarianism, transhumanism and long-termism, whose influences and relationships are shown in the following figure (see page 361 and original source dated 2013 on Julia Galef’s blog). They are themselves mixtures or synthesis of anarchism, liberalism and isolationism [Page 387]. Their political vision would be characterized by a lack of empathy as well as a willingness to go beyond the boundaries of mind and body [Page 388].

Once again, Olivier Alexandre gives a subtle description of the region: one can legitimately wonder about the novelty, the coherence of this constellation within a region which has a majority of pragmatist progressives, pro-government libertarians, liberals voting mostly Democrats, who (like Elon Musk) favor the investor state while demanding tax cuts [Page 394]. And adding in note 12, page 501: Libertarians are only a minority in Northern California. The Libertarian Party had 2,600 registered voters out of 468,000 voters in the city of San Francisco in the early 2010s.

I can’t resist adding here some additional references for my own archives:
– The vast majority of tech entrepreneurs are Democrats — but a different kind of Democrat. A big new survey tells us a lot about Silicon Valley’s politics by Dylan Matthews, Sep 6, 2017
– Techno-feudalism by Cédric Durand. See a review by Jérémy Lucas on Dygest (in French).
– Mouvement syndical et critique écologique des industries numériques dans la Silicon Valley (Labor movement and ecological criticism of the digital industries in Silicon Valley) by Christophe Lécuyer dans Réseaux 2022/1 (N° 231), pages 41 à 70
– Some articles with the #politics tag on this blog, including the recent work of Anthony Galluzzo who participated with Olivier Alexandre in programs on France Culture.

The impact on the region is known and is not new even if it has increased. The attractiveness of the region has left too many people behind and the observation already existed in … 1979. See for example Silicon Valley, more of the same that I published in the early days of this blog. The following extract deserves to be copied here again: “In 1979, I was a graduate student at Berkeley and I was one of the first scholars to study Silicon Valley. I culminated my master’s program by writing a thesis in which I confidently predicted that Silicon Valley would stop growing. I argued that housing and labor were too expensive and the roads were too congested, and while corporate headquarters and research might remain, I was convinced that the region had reached its physical limits and that innovation and job growth would occur elsewhere during the 1980s. As it turns out I was wrong” by AnnaLee Saxenian.

“I don’t necessarily blame the workers. […] By and large the real people in the tech industry don’t seek to do harm. In fact, they seek to do good, at least in the way they see it, especially the elders, the OPs [the Old Programmers]. But they are just one small piece in a larger system that is sinister. One of the things that I try to explain to people I work with about this industry is that one of the best parts of it is working with very smart people on projects you devote yourselves totally. When you work like that, there is something that happens… that makes you forget everything else. It’s like in a war… it causes people to develop a psychology where they become myopic to what surrounds them. That’s passionate work, and it’s wonderful. But if you go nearsighted, you can’t see anything outside your field of vision because you’re immersed in it. As a result, they are not against the right to housing, or more social justice. It’s just that it’s not part of their consciousness, they don’t feel like they have the ability to care or think about it, because they’re so focused on the task in front of them. When we started this organization, I had the good fortune to have a few experiences that opened my eyes to the corrupting influence of money. So we don’t do high-priced galas, I don’t go to wealthy family foundations, corporations or anything else to raise funds [Page 438, Brian Basinger, July 2016].

It is difficult to finish reading such a book and to review it. I can only encourage one last time to read it. I will limit myself to a few additional quotes: “The painful paradox of modern technology is that it has been so successful, but it has also failed miserably. We live in this paradox that challenges the very meaning of being modern” [Page 455, by Lee Bailey in The Enchantments of Technology].

This book is a description of an ultra-competitive but enchanted world, Balzacian in that the grandeur of ambitions meets the fragility of solutions. The analysis will serve those wishing to “change the world” as well as their critics determined to think of new models [Page 456].

Many thanks to Olivier Alexandre.

Tech – When Silicon Valley Changes the World (part 2)

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I’ve already written all the good things I thought of La Tech – Quand la Silicon Valley refait le Monde (Tech – When Silicon Valley Remakes the World) (see my previous post). Here is more.

Olivier Alexandre explains in his introduction that he conducted 147 in-depth interviews. His work is full of testimonies that often say more than, at least as , statistical analyses (the two complement each other wonderfully). Especially since in the second part of the book, the author describes essential but intangible ingredients of Silicon Valley: confidence, luck, social attitudes, for example. So I continue with a few excerpts.

“Google came to us in different ways and everyone will have a different story of how it happened. My version is the following: I started interviewing all the people who had a PhD at Stanford and who continued to work there in the engineering departments. It was about fifty people. They are the best and the brightest. And I asked each of them: Who is the best with the best idea? And almost all of them answered: the two guys who worked on Google. And what’s interesting about this story is that this way of doing things is exactly the same as Google’s algorithm.” [Page 195]

“In 2000, I had the vision of Facebook… But because we didn’t meet the right person, it didn’t work. I tried my luck until the end. It’s the investor’s assistant, who says to you: Sorry, he can’t see you. The guys who succeed, there is timing, perseverance, but also luck.” [Page 210]

“There is no concept of caste here, if you come up with a good idea, you will be able to meet guys, raise funds and sit at the table; I’m a living proof of that: we didn’t know anyone. We did not raise 20 million, ok; but we were given a chance; we screwed up, but that’s our problem. Afterwards, if the question is whether Silicon Valley is a utopia: it is not one, obviously. There are old families, networks of alumni, diasporas, new wealthy people, who help their friends and help each other; of course. But there is still this idea: we do not know you, but we will give you a chance.” [Page 211]

And funnier still, or more tragic: “Here everything is organized in communities… We are the first to suffer from being French abroad. It’s never easy to create a startup, even harder when you’re not at home. We all suffer from this. Because the codes are different. And you need to understand them and you’re not sure you understand them on your own. And it’s useful to meet someone who says to you: You’re not crazy, I’m having exactly the same problem and I think that… And that takes a lot of time. It took me four years. The French are arrogant when they arrive. They are so much that they think they are going to become Americans. It’s: Yes, I don’t want to see French people. So they go to the Americans. But without having the codes… I compare them to Barbapapa [A funny French alien family]. They are intelligent, they know how to adapt, but we still recognize them. On the other hand, he, the Barbapapa, he is persuaded to be a car when everyone knows that he is a Barbabapa. It doesn’t work at all. Me, for four years, it took me that long to first understand that you shouldn’t try to imitate them, and then that I wouldn’t be able to change them. […] Except that the French, he already blends into the decor, that physically, he looks like them, so he will blend into the thing, with an added bonus: subtlety. Which is actually exotic. The French entrepreneurs, the executives of the CAC40 who come here, I tell them: You are Senegalese in boubou who come from your village in the bush. Do you give a damn about guys from the Middle East who come to business meetings in traditional attire? But you are the same. You come in a tie… Have you seen people in a tie here? So you have to accept and tell yourself: I’m a Senegalese who just arrived in Paris, I’m black and I have a shitty accent, I don’t dress like them, and I can’t go back to the village, because otherwise I am the shame of the village, while everyone believes in me. They are the same: they are the light of France; when you realize that, that you are a projected dream in fact, how do you do when you are that guy? Well you reboot. Everything I did before doesn’t count. So it’s not an Italian renaissance. No way. It’s a rebirth, meaning that everything I’ve done doesn’t count. All the people I met no longer count and I have to build a new project and a new identity.” [Pages 208-210]

What is great and pretty amazing with this long excerpt is that Silicon Valley has not changed between the late 80s and 2016 when Olivier Alexandre conducted most of his interviews. The culture is absolultely the same ! (See the Post-Scriptum at the end of the article).

Pages 217 to 234 on the entrepreneurial experience are perhaps the most extraordinary that I have read since the beginning of the book. They should be quoted in full, so all to your readers! It is about roller coasters, the virtues of simplicity and sincerity, and energy capital. The illusion of meritocracy is another topic that brings complexity to the whole picture. With, at the end of the passage, “Gradually the articulation between the individual and the collective tends to be reversed: entrepreneurs become the imprint of their environment rather than impacting it. The company is the main vehicle of their dialectic.”

A permanent evolution in search of talents

In Silicon Valley, companies are therefore characterized by a Proteus syndrome, due to a pressure of constant evolution. […] The belief of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, managers and investors is that change is not only desirable but also “inevitable”. This horizon of expectation leads to making routines, these devices of predictability at the base of the efficiency of bureaucracies and large companies, objects of rejection. […] This dialectic of desired and organized change poses a series of problems within organizations: remaining effective despite instability, maintaining consistency despite changes.
[…] In the sector of new technologies, companies, whatever their size, seek to be innovative. However, innovation presupposes differentiated development phases. The first stages of a project are characterized by phases of trial and error, through tight and close exchanges with users; the usage value remains undetermined. This phase is based on the involvement of enthusiasts, at the crossroads of amateurism, research and the business world, in chiaroscuro spaces, on the border between public space and private space. The cliques formed on this occasion have a number of occurrences in the history of Silicon Valley: amateurs (“hobbyists”) in the field of broadcasting, hackers from MIT fiddling on the sly with DEC and IBM computers, participants of the Homebrew Computer Club in the 1970s, Nolan Bushnell programming his first game “Computer Space” in his daughter’s bedroom before founding Atari, the dormitory brogrammers behind Facebook, etc. After several years, a product with stable properties emerges. A second phase then begins.
The growth in the number of users and the addition of new functions require the involvement of workers with a high level of technical skills. However, developing a solution, increasing its capacities and the number of its applications, solving the problems that arise, are all objectives that require hiring. The profiles sought are designated in Silicon Valley according to a common metonymic name in the fields of creation, “talents”. […] This second phase is decisive in that it suggests a shift in financial terms. The organization is then ready to engage in a third phase, which brings it closer to traditional sectors: an operating technology, a structured and clearly identified market, with means of production, the counterpart of which is a slowed down innovation dynamic. Indeed, once a commercial niche has been invested and marked out, the teams tend towards the systematization of processes and the organization is characterized by effects of bureaucratization. These “slow” development companies (referred to as “slow moving organizations” in Silicon Valley) are often powerful but discredited because the learning effects are limited. To maintain a dynamic of innovation, large companies commonly resort to a so-called external growth strategy, by hiring or buying companies in order to integrate their innovations or their teams. The recent history of large companies illustrates the consistency of this strategy: Apple made 100 acquisitions between 1976 and 2020, Microsoft 225 in forty-five years of existence, Amazon 88 in twenty-five years, Facebook 82 in fifteen years, Google 236 in twenty years, an average of one acquisition per week. During these three phases, the destiny of organizations rests largely on the human factor. [Pages 242-5]

Company cultures

Faced with these constant challenges, it seems that Silicon Valley has developed a rather unique culture. Sincerity and simplicity are mentioned again with the famous pitch: “In presentations, there is a lot of waste, a lot of people don’t know what they are talking about and it is obvious right away. The speech is incoherent and they do not know how to express what they are doing precisely. And that is the first sign that they are going to screw up. They don’t know how to explain in a concise paragraph what they are doing. It is not just a problem of intellectual coherence. Oral and written communication is one of the fundamental skills of a successful entrepreneur. An entrepreneur must be able to raise funds. If he is not able to express clearly, concisely, what he does, why it is interesting and how it is new, he will not succeed” [Page 272].

Clearly establishing a mission makes it possible to stay on course whatever the circumstances and for the long term, by providing motivation to overcome difficulties, put suffering into perspective and make choices [Page 270]. Could this be an explanation to the quasi-absence of workers’ unions?

However, every company is different, even within the same sector. The openness and flow of information at Google, networking at Facebook, competition at Uber, design at Apple, etc. […] In the 2010s, Lyft made a name for itself by promoting a culture of openness and inclusion, in contrast to Uber [Page 268].

With some risk: “Company culture is our own spiel in Silicon Valley. […] But it’s still bullshit in the sense that it quickly becomes artificial if it’s not embodied. The thing is carried by the founder and it works as long as he is there, he is the one who embodies it, who carries it. […] But the day he leaves, values become boxes in an evaluation grid” [Page 283].

Post-Scriptum: personal notes related to the second part of the book.
– Olivier Alexandre gives very interesting statistics, especially on pages 170-72. I mention my own data on startups from Stanford or other startups that have prepared an IPO on this recent post. On the age of the founders – 45 years old -, the number of founders – 75% are more than 3 – or on the serial entrepreneurs – 60% are, I have built similar data sets.
– For those interested in the topic of startup acquisitions (M&A), here are two blog links: Cisco’s A&D and Google in the Plex. An additional link show that even public companies are often acquired.
– But as I said before, statistics are one thing. The description by a multitude of cases is another and the two complement each other perfectly, I believe. I remembered a trip to Silicon Valley in 2006. The report we made is confidential because of the non-anonymized testimonies. But I extract the non-secret part:

06-05-Trip in the Silicon Valley-FILTERED

Tech – When Silicon Valley Changes the World

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I had the chance to take part in a debate on France Culture with Olivier Alexandre the author of La Tech – Quand la Silicon Valley refait le Monde (Tech – When Silicon Valley changes the World). I say “chance” because I was able to discover a book which I consider to be among the best about this still poorly-known and fantasized subject that is this region of innovation and startups. In fact Fred Turner, an expert of the region, wrote on LinkedIn: “If you read French, you should read this book – a rich and close view of Silicon Valley by an outsider who has become an insider long enough to learn the system . Highly recommended”

It is perhaps because Olivier Alexandre was not a specialist of the region at the start of his career as a sociologist that his work is fascinating. The perspective he shows (which is not always the case with analysts who often take too negative or too positive point of views) and the variety of subjects he studies (although I am only a third of the way through) strenghten my belief, which I hope to confirm when I get to the last page. Here are some illustrations.

Players more than actors

To account for this state of mind and the conditions that favor it, it is therefore necessary to make a phenomenological detour. Entrepreneurs, investors and engineers seek to change the world, that is to say to put it into play. The term play is not understood here in the sense of idleness (hobby) or of a ludic phenomenon (amusement), but covers a mundane scope, i.e. the desire to modify the organization of the world by means of new technologies. For this reason, the workers of Silicon Valley will not be qualified as “agents”, “actants” or “actors” but as players, a notion which is often mobilized in English (“players”, whether they are “new”, “big” or “global”). It does not designate a specific professional category, but a mentality as well as a regime of action. [Page 28]

“We were all more or less in PhD programs at MIT. My co-founders did the VC [roadshow] tour. We were still students, we thought it was cool, to take a plane, to find ourselves in offices talking about research to get money from people who tell you: Great, go ahead, take this money, and you return with it to the airport. It was much more exciting than the lives of the rest of our college friends. For a 25-year-old kid, finding yourself with 2 or 3 million in the bank is super exhilarating. We went to an ATM, to see the balance of our bank account… And we planned: what we were going to need, how to assess the risks of what we were doing… We started to pay ourselves, which represented for a student a pretty insane amount of money, around 80,000 dollars a year, compared to 25,000 for a PhD student. And we moved to the Bay Area… To do a start-up, you have to have an idea… But the thing is, people are going to change, your idea is going to change, you have to be ready for that. And we weren’t ready for that. We thought we were super smart and our tech was super cool, which was the wrong way to do it [laughs]. After several months, we came to the conclusion that we were different, in our personalities, our agendas, on what a company was for us or what it was not… So, in the end, one went to Google, another went back to college, and we started something again together. The VCs said to us: OK you burned everything, but here is the money, 2-3 million, we believe in you.” [Page 96]

“Here you see two things: smart people and money. Money, there has been a lot of it and for a long time. Is it a bubble or not? That’s not the problem. The issue is concentration. When you go on Sand Hill Road [the street where the main venture capital brands are located], for a few kilometers, you have an insane amount of money that is concentrated… Venture capital in the world is 87 billion dollars, two-thirds is in the United States, and half of that is in Silicon Valley. When you realize this, you think to yourself Wow… it means that the two resources of the chemical reaction to undertake great things are available here. Paul Graham [founder of accelerator Y Combinator] says this is sufficient. But it’s not just that. It’s a bit like in Hollywood, with universities that intelligently play their role in an economy that is both global and local: there are labs that do research, specialized people, etc. In the movie industry, there are people who are capable of doing high-level janitorial work, of buying or liquidating a company, of negotiating contracts with seven, eight or nine figures. It’s the same thing here. There is this economy of specialized services, which is under the surface, which is an invisible but determining element. It is upon this that the ability to value a firm depends, i.e. to assign a value to it, or to liquidate it. In every sense of the term; and it is infinitely precious. Lawyers, specialized banks, VCs, HR firms specializing in start-ups, etc.” [Page 70]

This is another enlighting way of describing What makes an entrepreneurial ecosystem as mentioned by Nicolas Colin, Martin Kenney or Paul Graham again. But this description does not explain why Silicon Valley was never replicated. The author shows also that two important laws, Moore’s law and Metcalfe’s law had a strong impact in creating a virtuous cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies. [Pages 47-52]

A reversed capitalism

In Silicon Valley, three characteristics make the keeping of fair accounting particularly complex: the partial freeness of services, the practice of exchange, and the proportion of failures. [Page 89] … The exchange value corresponds to the usage value. However, the situation is different for intangible services, where consumption may be collective. For this reason, economists refer to intangible goods as public goods. [Page 90]

“On my first two start-ups, we never found the market fit. Never.” [Page 93] Market fit is credited to one of the region’s first venture capitalists, Don Valentine. Marc Andreessen helped to popularize it in the 2000s, through a post on his blog. On the inequalities of success of start-ups, he identifies three factors: the team, the product and the market, emphasizing that the most important of these three elements for the success of a company is the third term, the market (or “market fit”) justifying this position as follows: “In a large market – a market with many real potential customers – the market pulls the product from the start-up. The market must be satisfied and the market will be satisfied by the first viable product that comes along. The product doesn’t have to be great, it just has to work. And the market doesn’t care about the quality of the team, as long as the team can produce this viable product. In short, customers are knocking at your door; the main objective is to answer the phone and all the emails of people who want to buy. And when you have a great market, it’s remarkably easy to scale the team on the fly.” Chosen (and translated) by the author from web.stanford.edu/class/ee204/ProductMarketFit.html [Note 14 page 497] Here we find the fundamentals sought by VCs, as indicated in What makes Silicon Valley Venture Capital unique?

I had to find I disagreed with Olivier Alexandre, but it is at the level of detail, so successful is the first part of this book! “Kleiner Perkins had several difficult years before realizing a substantial return on investment with Sun Microsystems and Lotus Development in the early 1980s. Despite their rivalries, they [Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins] made a joint investment in Google in June 1999, at the initiative of micro-investor Ron Conway, against 5% of the shares of the company.” [Page 125] So my nuances are as follows:
– the first KP fund was particularly successful, as early as 1972, as indicated in About Kleiner Perkins first fund,
– I think that Sequoia and KP invested $25M for 34% of Google during the series B round and Ron Conway only arrived after, I think Andy Bechtolsheim was the business angel who made the intro, but I could be wrong. But here we are in the micro-detail. On the other hand, Pierre Lamond at Sequoia corrected me by claiming that despite their rivalry, KP and Sequoia had quite often invested together. The famous co-opetition of this world, people are in competition but collaborate… See When Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia co-invest(ed).

The Cultures of Silicon Valley

Silicon Valley is quite poor with culture (the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively) and Olivier Alexandre shows it by comparing the number of movie theaters, bookshops and art galeries in San Francisco and in other cities worldwide. Museums in Silicon Valley with the exception of one on the campus of Stanford University are not really impressive.

The culture of Silicon Valley, on the other hand, is unique. Alexandre mentions the praise of doing, freedom at work, an open society, a tradition of welcome, a progressive elite. “What struck me right away was that they were discussing what they would do, they were talking, without hiding, sharing information, talking about their business… People who for me were a priori competitors… Where I had been, in Paris, in New York, you had to remain secretive. Today, I’ve been here for seven years, I now know that it’s a typical cultural trait here. If you compare to elsewhere, in terms of cultural, psychological traits, there is this ability to say things.” [Page 156] How not to mention here the little-known Wagon Wheel Bar ?

Ultimately, the prevalence of the notions of “ecosystem” and “community” illustrates the ambiguities of this industry, certainly localized but with a globalized vocation: open to the integration of new entrants; but selective and Darwinian. [Page 165]

I hope you will discover this fascinating book. And certainly to be followed. In fact here.

What makes Silicon Valley Venture Capital unique?

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Friends from IMF sent me a link to a very interesting article entitled How Unique is VC’s American History?. You may have access to it here or there. It is an analysis of a book, Tom Nicholas’ VC: An American History that I have not read (yet). But the article is quite fascinating about the lack of answers about Venture Capital uniqueness of and reasons for its success.

Let me summarize by quoting & emphasizing:

1- A theme throughout the book is that the development of the VC industry and the structure and governance of VC investments can be understood through the lens of the allure of long-tailed, highly skewed returns, whereby sparse successes need to make up for a multitude of failures. Nicholas argues that skewed, long-tailed payoffs are a distinguishing feature of VC and its American antecedents and suggests that part of America’s comparative success at VC may be due to Americans’ relative affinity for such payoffs. […] Like modern VC investments, nineteenth-century whaling voyages were long-term projects that faced huge risks. Ships could be lost at sea or fail to find whales, and even completed voyages could have disappointing payloads. The result was a skewed, long-tailed distribution of returns similar to that of modern VC. […] We agree with Nicholas’s conclusion that American historical precedents such as the financing of whaling and cotton-spinning technology, and others detailed in the book, are highly related to modern VC. There is also little doubt that American VC has been uniquely successful in the world. However, it is less clear to us that the historical precedent is unique to the United States, or even uniquely successful, making it difficult to draw a causal link between VC’s American history and the success of modern US venture capital. In particular, the Dutch in the 16th and 17th centuries established trading ventures to East Asia on a massive scale for the time. Like whaling, these earlier expeditions share many similarities with modern VC, including skewed, long-tailed returns and complex governance mechanisms. Yet a modern VC industry with similar success to the U.S. did not arise in the Netherlands.

2- We also agree that positively skewed, long-tailed returns are indeed a hallmark of VC. But long-tailed returns are by no means unique to VC. As we discuss in Section 4 below, long-tailed returns arise naturally as a consequence of long-term holdings of risky assets more generally, including for instance the returns of public equities if they are held for many years. Thus, it is difficult to ascribe too much of the governance and structure of VC to the long-tailed nature of its returns.

3- Nicholas describes the unique position Silicon Valley enjoys today as the result of an agglomeration over time of a number of factors, including returns to scale from academic innovation (largely from Stanford University), military investment, the presence of influential early firms that led to entrepreneurial spinoffs, the weather, immigrants, and of course the development of the VC sector. What is much less clear is whether the agglomeration is simply due to serendipity. For instance, William Shockley founded Shockley Semiconductor in Silicon Valley because he happened to have a desire to move back to the San Francisco Bay area from the east coast to care for his ill mother. Departing employees from Shockley Semiconductor in turn founded Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, and the VC firm Kleiner Perkins, among many others. Had Shockley Semiconductor instead been formed on the east coast, in many ways a more natural place at the time, the evolution of Silicon Valley could easily have been very different.

Nicholas also outlines the genesis of some of Silicon Valley’s oldest and most successful VC partnerships. He stresses the different investment styles of the founding VCs. For example, Arthur Rock of Davis & Rock (later Venrock) emphasized investing in people, Tom Perkins of Kleiner Perkins focused on the technology, and Don Valentine of Sequoia Capital emphasized product markets. Each of these VCs was so successful that they are now legends in the VC community. Yet, given the disparity of styles, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the makings of a good VC. Moreover, consistent with the long-tail distribution of returns, the reputation of each of these VCs was cemented largely on the basis of a few homerun investments, such as Kleiner Perkins’s early investment in Genentech. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that these few early successes involved a large portion of luck, which became self-perpetuating because of increased access to the best new ventures (Nanda, Samila, and Sorenson 2020). If so, like the eminence of Silicon Valley itself, the early success of these top-tier VCs may have been serendipity.

Probably all of this is well-known but I found it particularly convincing in its synthetic shortness.

The Importance of Migrants according to Philippe Mustar

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A somewhat dated article (November 2022) reminded me of the importance of the subject. The article published by Le monde, “All Immigrants Are Entrepreneurs”, is for subscribers only and I can only quote the beginning:

A recent study by the National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP, 2022) on the origin of the creators of “unicorns”, these young companies not listed on the stock exchange and valued at more than a billion dollars (960 million euros) , shows not the importance but the predominant role of immigrants in the creation of the latter. In the United States, more than half of them (319 out of 582, or 55%) were founded or co-founded by one or more immigrants. If we take into account not only immigrants but also their children, this percentage rises to 64%. And when we broaden the spectrum by adding non-founding immigrants who occupy a key management position in the company (CEO or vice-president of technology), it reaches 80%. Immigration does play a massive role in the success of entrepreneurship in the United States.

This is all the more so since the analysis of these 319 companies highlights that 58% of them had one or more immigrant founders and no native founders, that 28% had a majority of immigrant founders or an equal number of immigrant and native founders , and that only 14% had a majority of native founders. As the study puts it: “Given that each co-founder contributes to the success of a start-up, it seems likely that none of these billion-dollar companies with at least one immigrant founder would exist or would not have been created in the United States if the foreign-born founder had not been allowed to come to the United States.”

The topic of migrants is not new here. Check the tag Immigrant and in particular:
– March 2016 : Immigrants and Unicorns.
– June 2013 : AnnaLee Saxenian, Migration, Silicon Valley, and Entrepreneurship.

I will not make long comments except to thank Philippe Mustar for his article and indeed to insist on the importance of migrants in the world of startups.

The myth of the entrepreneur – Undoing the imaginary of Silicon Valley (3/3)

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This is a very slight follow-up to the 2 posts about Galluzzo’s The Myth of the entrepreneur. The link is very weak: is Silicon Valley mostly about story telling or is it more about a complex technology cluster? As I combine both on this blog, I just add a look at what I wrote over years. It may look like an “ego trip” sorry, but it will be my online archive too! Yes there is a lot of storytelling, but there is also some research using statistics and tons of data…

Visiting Scholarship

How the state can be a venture capitalist? January 2019. Visiting scholarship at International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA. Draft of report available on demand.

Books and publications relevant to Innovation and Entrepreneurship

H. Lebret, Are Biotechnology Startups Different? April 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.12108

H. Lebret, Equity in Startups, September 2017. http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00661

H. Lebret, Startups and Stanford University, August 2017. http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00644

H. Lebret, Startups at EPFL, June 2017 papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3317131

H. Lebret, What Europe still has to learn from the US in academic innovation in Academic Spin-Offs and Technology Transfer in Europe Edited by Sven H. De Cleyn (Chapter 12), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2016 ISBN: 9781784717377

H. Lebret, Start-up, A Culture of Innovation, Amazon.com – March 2016
H. Lebret, Start-Up, une culture de l’innovation (French Edition), Amazon.com – Mars 2016

H. Lebret, Age and Experience of High-tech Entrepreneurs, Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference 2014
H. Lebret, Age and Experience of High-tech Entrepreneurs, Journal of Business and Economics, vol.5, nb.12, pp.2327-2336. DOI: 10.15341/jbe(2155-7950)/12.05.2014/013

H. Lebret Serial Entrepreneurs: Are They Better? – A View from Stanford University Alumni. August 2012. Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BCERC) Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: Vol. 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133127

H. Lebret Stanford University and High-Tech Entrepreneurship: An Empirical Study, April 2010, Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BCERC) Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: Vol. 30: Iss. 5, Article 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983858

H. Lebret Start-up, What we may still learn from Silicon Valley, November 2007
http://www.amazon.com/Start-up-still-learn-Silicon-Valley/dp/1434820068
CreateSpace – ISBN – 1-4348-2006-8
H. Lebret Start-up, ce que nous pouvons encore apprendre de la Silicon Valley, December 2007
http://www.amazon.com/Start-up-pouvons-encore-apprendre-Silicon/dp/1434817334
CreateSpace – ISBN – 1-4348-1733-
www.startup-book.com A related blog where I update news about start-ups, Silicon Valley and Europe.

H. Lebret, J.-A. Månson, P. Aebischer. The EPFL approach to Innovation Universities and Business: Partnering for the Knowledge Society – Luc E. WEBER and James J. DUDERSTADT (eds)
Publisher: ECONOMICA, ISBN 2-7178-5190-9 – First published 2006

A. Catana and H. Lebret, Technology Transfer at the EPFL Europhysics News (2004) Vol. 35 No.6

G. Zocco and H. Lebret. Quality start-ups will always find financing. Les start-ups de qualité trouveront toujours du financement. AGEFI, supplément au numéro 198, 15 octobre 2001

The publication of the two versions (French and English) of “Start-Up” induced invitations to publications (in chronological order) that can be found on the blog

– Success story – quarterly contributions to Créateurs newsletter
Adobe – John Wanorck et Charles Geschke – mars 2009
Genentech – Bob Swanson et Herbert Boyer – juin 2009
Femmes entrepreneurs – Carol Bartz et Sandy Kurtzig – septembre 2009
Un européen dans la Silicon Valley, Aart de Geus – décembre 2010
Un Suisse dans la Silicon Valley – Edouard Bugnion – mars 2010
Give back to the community – Swissquote – juin 2010
Une manière suisse d’entreprendre ?– octobre 2010

– Federation of Entreprises Romandes (initially in French)
Pourquoi les grands succès dans le domaine des nouvelles technologies sont-ils dans l’immense majorité issus des États-Unis ? December 2011
About the challenges of innovation. March 2012
Is Intellectual Property out of Breath? August 2012
Failure is a learning experience. December 2012
Does the Swiss culture tolerate failure? July 2013
The Immigrant, Factor of Creation. January 2014
A Look Back at the Swiss February 9 Votation. February 2014
Innovation and Society: are the Returns and Benefits Sufficient? June 2014
“You have money, but you have little capital.” February 2015
Why doesn’t Europe create any Google or Apple? August 2015
Myths and Realities of Serial Entrepreneurs. May 2016
The digital revolution: stakes and challenges (for Switzerland). November 2016
Virtual Innovations? May 2018

– Start-up chronicles on EPFL Web Site- http://actu.epfl.ch/search/start-up-epfl/
Medtech, Good for Switzerland -January 2013
Two EPFL Start-ups Take Off in Tandem – October 2012
What’s a start-up worth, or reflections on Facebook’s IPO fiasco – August 2012
Start-ups hiding six feet under – June 2012
Kandou and investment – April 2012
SWISSto12 – Of Start-ups and Men – March 2012
Aleva – is venture capital a universal solution? – February 2012

Internal reports and presentations (chronological order)
Most content available on Slideshare – www.slideshare.net/lebret/presentations

 A few facts about academic spin-offs – Nov 05
 A brief history of Google – Jan06 and updated 2013
 A trip in the Silicon Valley – May 06
 Academic spin-offs: some anecdotal evidence from a Stanford University Lab – Jun 06
 The EPFL Innovation Forum – Aug 06, Oct 07, Nov 08
 EPFL start-ups –analysis ongoing since Sept 06
 The Innovation Support around EPFL – ongoing since Sept 06
 SW/IT: a workshop on entrepreneurship – Oct 06
 Equity split in starts-ups – Oct06
 Why is the US Innovation System better? – SEISGE EPFL workshop – Oct 06
 A brief history of venture capital – Nov 06 and updated 2012
 Course MINT – Evaluation of an invention potential (2004-2009)
 Course VENTURE LAB – Intellectual Property (2005-2009)
 Founders at Work, Betting it All, In the Company of Giants – Notes from the Books – Jun-Dec 08
 Stanford start-ups – in progress (October 08- September 09), a study on 2’500 small companies.
 Examples and synthesis of academic licenses to start ups – May 2010
 Equity in high tech start-ups with venture capital – 2010 and updated 2012, 2014, 2017
 The venture capital process – December 2012
 Ten ideas to innovate in uncertain times – November 2015
 Is Switzerland a Startup Nation? – October 2017

The myth of the entrepreneur – Undoing the imaginary of Silicon Valley (2/3)

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I have finished reading Anthony Galluzzo’s book which I already mentioned in part 1 a few days ago. I hesitate between irritation and a more positive appreciation because I do not know if the author simply wants to undo the imaginaty of the region or to criticize its functioning more broadly. Indeed in the last two pages of his excellent book he writes: “After reading this book, some may wonder about the possibility of “undoing” the entrepreneurial imaginary; not only to deconstruct it, but to lead it to defeat”. Then he adds: “Many commentators have already noted this: to undo an economic and social system it is not enough to demystify the beliefs and refute the syllogisms conveyed by its ideology. It is also necessary to simultaneously think of another economy and another imaginary, to make other desirable representations and incarnations of human existence prosper.”

Silicon Valley as an ecosystem and its dark sides

I do not know what to think. An imaginary does not make a system, even if it is undoubtedly an important ingredient. Behind story telling and the myth of the heroic entrepreneur, there is an ecosystem that Galluzzo talks about more in the interview he gave to Echo (To understand the economy, you have to tell it through ecosystems, not trhough individuals – Pour comprendre l’économie, il faut la raconter par les écosystèmes, non par les individus) than in his book. Silicon Valley is an ecosystem and not (just) a myth factory to hide a darker situation [1].

Of course, there are dark sides in Silicon Valley. He shows it well in the beginning of his book, which I relate in my previous post, for example through the war for talents or the invisibilization of the State. His description is darker and darker in the end, even if the new elements are just as true:
– a glaring imbalance in the population of entrepreneurs with few women or African Americans,
– an under-representation of trade unions which would have deserved a more in-depth analysis,
– employees at the bottom of the ladder who are less well treated (assuming that these jobs have not been relocated),
– an unbalanced taxation [page 206] which would also have deserved a more in-depth analysis.

Galluzzo mentions tokenism as the reason for story telling. In the sociological literature, the practice of symbolically integrating minority groups to escape the charge of discrimination is called “tokenism” [Page 204]. Galluzzo also admits that there is not always story telling. Larry Page and Sergey Brin, the creators of Google are at the origin of one of the main powers of Silicon Valley and yet are relatively unknown to the general public. They have always been quite discreet, with rare and well-defined speeches. They did not invest in storytelling and personal branding [Page 218]. Nor does Galluzzo mention the thousands of unknown and often failed entrepreneurs who are a vital component of the region.

He adds that Silicon Valley would have flourished with almighty Thatcher neoliberalism. But it seems to me that he forgets that Silicon Valley really flourished in the two preceding decades, that of the 60s (Fairchild, Intel) which allowed the development of semiconductors and that of the 70s (Microsoft, Apple) for computers . He seems to forget, even if he mentions it, that without the structuring of venture capital in these two decades, but also without the arrival of highly qualified migrants in the decades that followed, there would probably be no such Silicon Valley such as it exists (and not as it is mythologized). I don’t think the subject is so “swept under the rug”. As early as the 1980s, a relatively mainstream author showed the darker sides of the region in his book Silicon Valley Fever. You can also read The Capital Sins of Silicon Valley.

What is an entrepreneur?

The pages [pages 196-98] on the definition or traits of an entrepreneur are also very interesting.

How to define the “entrepreneur”? A first approach consists in considering him simply as a business creator: someone who starts and organizes an economic activity. We mix the small craftsman and the big boss; the baker and the wealthy start-up founder. To focus on the latter, should we add to our definition an order of magnitude as to the economic success of the company and if so, which one? Should we limit the category to those who have founded a small business in hyper-growth? Another solution is to introduce the notion of risk. The entrepreneur would be the one who mobilizes resources in a situation of uncertainty; he would be the one who succeeds in his bets on the future. [Page 196]

Faced with these problems, it may seem essential to use the criterion of innovation. The entrepreneur would be the one who organizes a new combination of means of production: the one who develops a new product, develops a new method of production, creates a new market, conquers a new source of supply or disturbs the organization of a whole sector. […] However, defining the entrepreneur as an innovator requires de facto to separate innovation from the process, to extract it from the continuum, to attribute it, often very artificially, to a single actor. [page 197]

When research in entrepreneurship developed in the 1980s, it quickly focused on the questions of who was the particular personality of the entrepreneur. […] Among the traits that have been the subject of several studies, we note the propensity to risk, the tolerance for ambiguity, the need for accomplishment and the locus of internal control [the locus of internal control indicates the tendency that individuals have to consider that the events that affect them are the result of their actions] This research did not yield any conclusive results. [Page 198]

Galluzzo could have mentioned the definition of a startup given by Steve Blank which has been almost universally adopted, it gives a fairly convincing perimeter to the tech entrepreneur, the one in question here: “Start-ups are temporary entities looking for a scalable and repeatable business model.”

Finally on several occasions, Galluzzo seems to show his preference for the builder more than for the creator, Markkula rather than Jobs in the early days of Apple, Cook rather than Jobs in its last days: Bloomberg recently ranked all the CEOs in Apple history based on how the company’s valuation has evolved under their leadership; Steve Jobs (1997-2011, +12.4%) is far behind Mike Markkula (1981-1983, +64%) and John Sculley (1993-1993, +106%). Tim Cook outperforms them all with a +561% increase. I did not have access to the article and I could have been wrong but I arrive at different results for the growth rates from my multiples: Markkula, 4x in 2 years or 100%, Sculley around 1x or 0 %, Jobs (second period) 100x in 14 years or 40% and Cook, 10x in 12 years or 25%. Finally Jobs (1st period – in reality Scott) 1600x in 4 years or 500%. But this last subject is all the less important as I am not sure of all these figures. Founder, builder, storytelling and reality, these are subjects that remain fascinating. Thanks to Anthony Gazzullo for his excellent book and the thoughts it prompted me.

[1] Here are elements that describe an ecosystem and that I took from a post dated October 2015:

“5 needed ingredients of tech. clusters”
1. Universities and research centers of a very high caliber;
2. An industry of venture capital (i.e. financial institutions and private investors);
3. Experienced professionals in high tech;
4. Service providers such as lawyers, head hunters, public relations and marketing specialists, auditors, etc.
5. Last but not least, an intangible yet critical component: a pioneering spirit which encourages an entrepreneurial culture.
in “Understanding Silicon Valley, the Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region”, by M. Kenney, more precisely in chapter: “A Flexible Recycling” by S. Evans and H. Bahrami

Paul Graham in How to be Silicon Valley? “Few startups happen in Miami, for example, because although it’s full of rich people, it has few nerds. It’s not the kind of place nerds like. Whereas Pittsburgh has the opposite problem: plenty of nerds, but no rich people.” He also added about failed ecosystems: “I read occasionally about attempts to set up “technology parks” in other places, as if the active ingredient of Silicon Valley were the office space. An article about Sophia Antipolis bragged that companies there included Cisco, Compaq, IBM, NCR, and Nortel. Don’t the French realize these aren’t startups?”

Finally, entrepreneurial ecosystems need 3 ingredients – I quote:
– capital: by definition, no new business can be launched without money and relevant infrastructures (which consist of capital tied up in tangible assets);
– know-how: you need engineers, developers, designers, salespeople: all those whose skills are necessary for launching and growing innovative businesses;
– rebellion: an entrepreneur always challenges the status quo. If they wanted to play by the book, they would innovate within big, established companies, where they would be better paid and would have access to more resources.

The myth of the entrepreneur – Undoing the imaginary of Silicon Valley

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A friend mentioned this new book about Silicon Valley to me a few days ago and I quote: “The author’s argument is wrong (but it’s pernicious). […] Indeed, entrepreneurship generates excellence and independent-minded people, while [another view – opposition to liberal capitalism] creates a population of people dependent upon the state.”

I’m not sure I agree with my friend: on the one hand, the relationship between collective and individual is a key topic around entrepreneurship. Does a company create value without “outstanding” individuals? The subject is as old as the world. On the other hand, the distribution of this value is a second subject which belongs among other things to the field of taxation and Piketty has clearly shown that, for several decades, the distribution gap has greatly increased in favor of the richest to the detriment of the poorest.

Marianna Mazzucato has shown this imbalance in The Entrepreneurial State, which she finds all the more unfair as she shows the primordial role of the State in upstream funding (education, research, public services in general) which provides a favorable context for the creation of wealth.

In the beginning of his book, Le mythe de l’entrepreneur – Défaire l’imaginaire de la Silicon Valley (The Myth of the Entrepreneur – Unraveling the Imaginary of Silicon Valley), Anthony Galluzzo explains similar things but it seems different to me. I am only at the beginning and I will see later how closely it joins the criticism introduced above. The author is a specialist in merchant imaginary and the subtitle is convincing, namely that it is necessary to deconstruct the imaginary of this region, based on story-telling around the stars of the region, such as Steve Jobs and Elon Musk (although Elon Musk has largely lost his aura). It shows us that Elisabeth Holmes tried the same approach but succeeded only very partially.

Joseph Schumpeter is quoted extensively in the book at the beginning, in particular it seems to me, for a critique of the role of the entrepreneur and of creative destruction. Galluzzo prefers to use destructive creation to show the chronology of actions. But I didn’t see in the beginning of the book, at least, that Schumpeter adds that capitalism cannot exist without advertising. So without story-telling and imaginary.

This imaginary of Silicon Valley is therefore, I believe, only what allows capitalism to self-develop, to survive, with all the current paradoxes of destructive waste. But behind this imaginary, what is the reality? Galluzzo refuses to oppose entrepreneurs and businessmen. I understand the argument. Creators, stars at least, can make a lot of money. But I don’t know if the main reason is their ability to do business or if they are simply at the origin of a creation that makes it possible to do business. I am neither an economist, nor a historian, nor a sociologist and I find it very difficult to make sense of things, all other things being equal.

Anatomy of the Myth – the Heroic Entrepreneur

So here are a few things that I found interesting in the beginning of the book:

1- The solitary entrepreneur

Steve Jobs was not alone and worse is perhaps not critical to the initial success. The story is indeed quite well known while Jobs is seen as the only genius of Apple.
– Steve Wozniak is the real genius (Galluzzo will not like the term) behind the first computers from Apple.
– Steve Jobs is said to have “stolen” [Page 35] many ideas from Xerox to build his machines. The story is known but the term “stealing” is too strong even if many Xerox employees were shocked. Xerox received Apple shares in exchange for this rather unique deal in history.
– “Mike Markkula can be considered the true founder of Apple, the one who transformed a small, insignificant hobbyist operation into a structured and solidly financed start-up. » [Pages 19-20]
– “Arthur Rock, meanwhile, is one of the most important figures in Silicon Valley, he contributed to the emergence of the largest companies in the region – Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, then Apple. However, no biography has ever been devoted to him and his wikipedia page is starving”. [Page 20]

I will nuance Galluzzo’s remarks again. Certainly Wozniak, Markkula and Rock have not penetrated the imagination of the general public, but Silicon Valley connoisseurs are not unaware of them and the film Something Ventured (which Galluzzo does not seem to mention in his very rich bibliography) does not forget them at all. And what about this cover of Time Magazine.

2- The war for talent

“The functioning of the labor market in Silicon Valley, however, shows us a completely different dynamic. The industrial concentration in this region leads to significant personnel movements: an engineer can easily change company, without moving or changing his lifestyle. […] This high degree of labor mobility has been observed since the 1970s, when on average IT professionals only stayed in their jobs for two years [Cf AnnaLee Saxenian’s Regional Advantage]. When circulating like this, employees, even bound by non-disclosure agreements, take with them their experiences and knowledge. The propagation of this tacit knowledge is at the heart of the ecosystem, it allows permanent collective tacit learning. » [Page 45]

Galluzzo gets to the heart of the matter here, which makes Silicon Valley unique. Not so much the concentration of talent, which exists in all developed regions. But the circulation of talent. Almost everything is said!

However, Galluzzo adds a significant nuance that I was less familiar with: “Therefore, problems arise for entrepreneurs relating to what has been called in business jargon the “war for talents”. To carry out his projects, he must succeed in appropriating the most precious commodity there is, the work force of highly qualified engineers.” [Page 46]

Galluzzo then mentions the stock options, the aggressive recruitment but also this: “Another court case illustrates well the issues of employee retention. In the 2000s, several Silicon Valley giants, including Intel, Google and Apple, formed a “wage cartel”, mutually agreeing not to attempt to poach employees. This tacit agreement was intended to eliminate all competition for skilled workers and to limit wage increases.” [Page 47 & see Google, Apple, other tech firms to pay $415M in wage case]

3- The invisibilization of the State

The subject is also known and I mentioned it above. We too often forget the role of the collective in the possibility of favorable conditions and context. But Galluzzo shows that too often there is even a certain hatred of the collective, illustrated by the growing visibility of libertarians. It is also known, Silicon Valley is afraid of unions. Here’s another example I didn’t know:

“I want the people who teach my children to be good enough to be employed in the company I work for, and earn $100,000 a year. Why should they work in a school for $35-40,000 a year if they can get a job here at $100,000? We should hire them and pay them $100,000, but of course the problem is the unions. Unions are the worst thing that has happened to education. Because it is not a meritocracy, but a bureaucracy. »

You have to read the entire excerpt and maybe even the entire interview with Steve Jobs. Excerpts from an Oral History Interview with Steve Jobs. Interviewer: Daniel Morrow, April 20, 1995. Computerworld Smithsonian Awards. We are there in the core American culture and the importance given to competition between individuals rather than to the equality of the members of the collective.

So are there geniuses or not? Is there only Darwinian emergence of talents a posteriori among those who will have survived? I don’t know or I don’t know anymore. Probably something in between. Or maybe it is an act of faith, as long as sociology does not have elements that will allow me to have a more convincing opinion…

To be continued…

Time and Space Maps of Silicon Valley (in the 80s)

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I had published in the past genealogies (time maps) of Silicon Valley startups and venture capital. Here they are again:

Genealogy of Silicon Valley startups (1957-1986)

Genealogy of West Coast Venture Capital (1958-1983)

But there have been other (“artistic”) maps, strangely in the 80s also. Here are three similar versions from 1983-1986.

Maps of Silicon Valley by Pacific Ventures (1983-86)

Of course these ones have a background history with Steinberg’s New Yorker cover in March 76. And for my Swiss friends what about this Zuricher one?

What is interesting to me is its nostalgic value. So what names are worth noticing? On the left one or below, of course, Apple, Intel HP, IBM but also Tandem, National Semi, Varian, Fairchild, Ask, and a little surprisingly Stanford University, all in between highways 101 and 280, finally Genentech, Atari, Rolm between San Jose and San Francisco and behind the Bay Area, Berkeley, New York, technology clusters Route 128 in Boston, Research Triangle in North Carolina & Austin’s Silicon Gulch. Finally emerging and threatening Japan in the mid 80s…

What to add to the one in 1984? Not much except that both HP and Intel, but not IBM anymore, are in the foreground… Do you remember the Apple vs. IBM 1984 advertising?

So what about 1986? Well I see 3com, Borland, Sun, Silicon Graphics. Silicon Graphics went public in October 1986, Sun on March 4, 1986 (by the way Oracle had gone public on March 12, 1986 and Microsoft on March 13, 1986…). 3Com’s IPO was in 1984. Borland was always strangely structured with an IPO in London in 1986 before doing it in the USA in 1989. 1986 is a bit of a turning point: software became an industry in itself, Sun, Silicon Graphics, 3Com represent also the beginning of networked computers.

Forget nostalgia. Silicon Valley has changed a lot. Apple is still around, Oracle too but have a look at this new illustration! Apple is in a new building. Facebook (sorry Meta) and Google (sorry Alphabet) are the new giants. HP is also mentioned through its garage! There are the old ones (Intel, AMD, IBM, HP), the already old like Yahoo, not to forget Cisco, Adobe, YouTube, LinkedIn, Intuit and more “iconic” landmarks like Sand Hill Road, or Cafe Borrone and Buck’s restaurant.

But always remember. Silicon Valley is not about buildings as Folon rightly showed. And you know what, it is dated 1985…

Larry Page and Peter Thiel – 2 (different?) Icons of Silicon Valley

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I just read two long and interesting articles about these important personalities of Silicon Valley. The one about Larry Page was mentioned to me by a colleague (thanks François!) through its French translation. It is rather old (2014) but still very interesting and relevant : The Untold Story of Larry Page’s Incredible Comeback (Nicholas Carlson – April 24, 2014).

The one about Peter Thiel was recently published by the New Yorker, I find it a little less interesting as there is not much new, but still very clear as usual with this great magazine : What Is It About Peter Thiel? The billionaire venture capitalist has fans and followers. What are they looking for? (Anna Wiener – October 27, 2021)

What do they have in common, I am not sure: they have very different personalities, one is rather secretive, the other very visible. They certainly have in common the belief that technology and entrepreneurship can (still?) change the world, but Thiel puts this as a political statement and I believe he is wrong. Politics are about collective decisions (I hope), wheras entrepreneurship is more individual decisions (I think) even if is does include cultural (therefore collective) features.

Page was born in 1973 in Michigan and Thiel in 1967 in Germany, they both studied at Stanford University, Thiel in the law school, Page in the engineering school. They apparently both funded the Singularity university, something I do not really understand except the link to their extreme belief in technology saving the world…

I have written so much about them, you may want to check that through the tags #thiel or #google. In the article about Larry Page, there are very interesting moments, for example his “lessons” about management:
– Don’t delegate: Do everything you can yourself to make things go faster.
– Don’t get in the way if you’re not adding value. Let the people actually doing the work talk to each other while you go do something else.
– Don’t be a bureaucrat.
– Ideas are more important than age. Just because someone is junior doesn’t mean they don’t deserve respect and cooperation.
– The worst thing you can do is stop someone from doing something by saying, “No. Period.” If you say no, you have to help them find a better way to get it done.

It’s really worth reading these two articles and see again how much diversity there is (or not) in Silicon Valley. The last sentences of the articles about Page says: Instead of ending his life destitute and ignored, [contrary to his icon, Nikola Tesla] Page, still just 41, will spend the final half of his life pouring billions of dollars and countless hours into his wildest visions. “Anything you can imagine probably is doable,” Page told Google investors in 2012. “You just have to imagine it and work on it.”

Whereas the one about Thiel ends in a little more mysterious but enlightening way: Of course, when it comes to Thiel, what registers as mystique may simply be practiced opacity. Strauss, the conservative philosopher, proposed that academics and writers often advance their ideas through intentionally obscure prose — a technique in which “the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines,” such that it is legible “not to all readers, but to trustworthy and intelligent readers only.” In interviews, Thiel can come across as “Straussian” — opaque, enigmatic, even oracular. He is a master of conversational redirection, and his arguments can be indeterminate. Religious references and allusions lend his ideas about business or globalization a sense of mysticism, as though the truth of his own speech is lurking just around the corner. Online, clues proliferate — about Thiel’s ideas and much else. Sleuths hunt for meaning, and search for signs indicating that they are among the “trustworthy and intelligent.” For Thiel’s fans, part of his appeal must be the endless opportunities he presents for decoding, deciphering, and hypothesizing. He offers readers the anticipation of revelation. Then again, the truth could be much simpler: when money talks, people listen.